By Abdelmonem Fawzi
The Egyptian and Turkish navies conducted a joint exercise off the Egyptian Mediterranean coast earlier this month.
The drills came as Cairo maintained its firm rejection of a maritime deal between Libya and Türkiye, one that was approved recently by the eastern Libya parliament.
Dating back to 2019, the deal, initially signed by Ankara and the western Libya government, grants the two sides rights in areas that overlap with the rights of Egypt and other countries in the region.
Naval units from Egypt and Türkiye participated in the drills which are called “Sea of Friendship 2026”. They included surface naval operations, anti-submarine warfare, air defence, and underwater offensive operations.
As is known, joint military exercises serve practical, tactical, and diplomatic purposes. They assist militaries learn from
each other and how to work together.
Participating forces match their communication systems, logistics, combat concepts, and command-and-control procedures so they
can operate smoothly in real-world coalitions or joint operations.
These joint military exercises also bridge cultural and structural differences between allied troops.
However, these Egyptian-Turkish drills raise an important question: Can these two regional heavyweights reach rapprochement, despite their current disagreements on some sensitive regional issues?
Egypt seeks to build a framework for political co-operation with Türkiye based on coordinating shared interests without requiring complete agreement on contentious issues.
Türkiye has finally realised that co-operation with Egypt is crucial, given current regional geopolitical challenges, which brings it close to the region’s second most powerful nation militarily.
This strategic and pragmatic rapprochement to serve a range of vital political, economic, and military interests comes as the regional power of balance undergoes change.
Ankara seeks to build an effective and influential partnership with Cairo on the road to managing major regional issues in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, given that both capitals are key powerhouses in the region.
Türkiye also wants to raise its trade with Egypt to $15 billion by maintaining a large manufacturing and business base and enhancing economic co-operation to address internal economic challenges that could only be addressed by opening new foreign markets and promoting mutual investment.
This comes at a time when Turkish strategists view Egypt as a premier destination for Turkish industrial and manufacturing investment in North Africa.
Türkiye also wants to upgrade its defence and security partnership with Egypt, which has so far included joint air and naval exercises, by exploring joint military manufacturing, including in the making of warships and missiles.
Egyptian striker Mohamed Salah is, meanwhile, riding the crest of a wave of popularity in Türkiye, fostering a greater desire for closer ties between the peoples of both countries.
When he arrived in Türkiye in August 2016, Salah was more than just another transfer to the Turkish Premier League. He received a remarkably warm welcome from Turkish fans, while his transfer to Trabzonspor quickly became a major sporting and media event that transcended the boundaries of the club and the city.
Signs of Salah’s popularity preceded the transfer itself. In July, Besiktas fans chanted his name during the presentation of another player, revealing that Salah had not just entered the Turkish sporting scene as a newcomer, but had already arrived with considerable public acceptance and interest.
It coincided with the political rapprochement between Egypt and Türkiye, giving this move a popular face that resonates with millions, moving beyond the dry rhetoric of political statements.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was reportedly closely monitoring Salah’s transfer to the Turkish league, thanks to the player’s ability to promote Turkish as a brand. There is talk also about arrangements for a meeting between the Egyptian player and the Turkish leader in Ankara.
Salah is becoming a Turkish tourism promoter, especially after the landmarks he visited in Trabzon have become tourist attractions for fans. This directly benefits the country’s plans to revitalise the economy and promote its international relations.
In my assessment, these developments show that Egypt and Türkiye are now able to separate their legal and maritime disputes from their shared economic, security, and strategic interests.
As is the case, Cairo and Ankara have chosen to manage these disputes while simultaneously developing a broader partnership, having recognised the significant benefits that their détente can bring.
Abdelmonem Fawzi
Writer and expert on international relations







