By Dr Osama Al-Azhari
Minister of Awqaf
(Charitable Endowments)
The intellectual basis on which Sayyid Qutb formulated his theory of takfir (labelling someone as an apostate) stands among the most consequential issues in the contemporary Islamic thought. It reflects a cumulative intellectual project that has been constructed, expanded, and reshaped over decades, evolving through successive phases from the early 1940s to the present time.
The initial seeds of this intellectual project can be traced back to the thought of Hasan al-Banna in the 1940s. Then it developed and took shape in the writings of a number of authors and thinkers, until it reached its peak in the works of Sayyid Qutb, who recast al-Banna’s legacy into a more actionable framework embraced by certain religious currents.
The historical absence of al-Banna following his assassination in the late 1940s arguably allowed Qutb to carry this intellectual development further, producing a more pronounced and distinctive Qutbian shift that later manifested in some currents of militant takfir (labelling someone as an apostate).
This project extends beyond the mere production of militant thought; it constitutes a comprehensive system of concepts and reference frameworks that continually generate diverse factions and models of takfir, reproducing themselves over time. Its components have accumulated across more than eight decades from the 1940s through the 1950s and 1960s and into the early twenty-first century.
Over this period, a range of religious movements, schools of thought, and intellectual and literary institutions have emerged, formulating doctrinal systems of takfir that, in turn, have produced their own theorists and ideological architects. Although some of these figures remained far removed from direct involvement in armed activity, they nonetheless played a significant role in consolidating the theoretical foundations upon which this ideology rests.
Takfiri thoughts (thoughts that are based on labelling someone as an apostate) are marked by a persistent tendency toward fragmentation, whereby each faction gives rise to another that, in turn, condemns its predecessors as apostates even within a single overarching framework.
Consequently, the scope of takfir progressively widens to include the broader public, evolving from a religious position into a psychological disposition and an adversarial mindset, whose adherents actively seek arguments and proofs to present under the mantle of religious legitimacy.
In this context, Sayyid Qutb is regarded as one of the most prominent figures in intensifying the intellectual framework of takfir. His literary works, which at times lack strict scholarly methodological grounding, were later repurposed as a basis for formulating a practical approach in the thinking of extremist groups.
Among the key ideas appropriated by such movements is Qutb’s notion of hakimiyyah (governorship), along with his well-known assertion, “hakimiyyah (governorship) is the most distinctive attribute of divinity.” This formulation was seen as highly controversial by many traditional scholars, as it extends beyond established jurisprudential understandings, imbuing the concept of hukm (governance) with a theological dimension that touches upon the core meaning of divinity.
The risk inherent in this conception is that it broadens the idea of hukm (governance) to the point of making it an exclusive attribute of God alone.
This, in turn, leads to the classification of any human legislation, positive law, or institutional practice as a form of associating partners with God in legislation. As a result, proponents of takfir regard such systems as a “tyrannical and unbelieving order,” and consequently view state institutions, legal codes, public prosecution bodies, and parliaments as symbols of disbelief. Such an interpretation constitutes an unwarranted overextension that contradicts the established position of Muslim scholars, who have clearly distinguished between denying a fundamental doctrinal principle and merely falling into error or deficiency in practical implementation.
However, in my assessment, the essence of the phenomenon of takfir (labelling someone as an apostate) is not confined to jurisprudential disagreement alone, but is rooted in a deeper psychological defect manifested in arrogance and an adversarial mindset.
This disposition leads its holder to assume for himself the authority to judge others’ faith, classifying them as believers or unbelievers, and to rationalise violence under religious justification.
This observation was also highlighted by the respected scholar Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti in his work Batin al-Ithm” (The Inner Sin), in which he stressed that the true sin lies in arrogance, which constitutes the foundation of extremist deviations. For, as he explains, anyone who deems himself free from error and claims possession of the absolute truth departs from the principles of humility and the established standards of sound scholarly methodology in Islamic thought.
The tendency toward takfir is not a contemporary development; rather, its early manifestation can be traced back in Islamic history to the Kharijites, who conflated practical mistakes with doctrinal disbelief and declared those who failed to conform to their own understanding of faith and justice as apostates.
In response to one of their objections, the Prophet (PBUH) said: “Woe to you, who will be just if I am not just?” He also described them, saying: “A people will emerge from the offspring of this man who will recite the Book of Allah, but it will not go beyond their throats; they will leave the fold of religion as an arrow passes through its quarry.” This prophetic description captures the enduring essence of Takfiri ideology across different periods: a deviation from moderation and a transgression of legitimate bounds under the guise of religious zeal.
A central argument employed by advocates of takfir to legitimise their extremist interpretations is the decontextualisation of Qur’anic verses and their forced reading in a manner that serves ideological objectives.
Among the most frequently cited is the verse: “And whoever does not judge according to what Allah has sent down, then those are they (who are) the disbelievers.” [Qur’an 5:44], which they invoke without consideration of the extensive interpretive tradition of the Companions, the Followers, and major classical exegetes such as al-Razi, al-Qurtubi, Ibn Kathir, al-Ghazali, and al-Sha’rawi.
These scholars consistently distinguished between rejecting the divine governance of Allah’s revelation and merely failing to apply it fully or correctly in practice. By contrast, the Qutbian interpretation elevated this verse into a sweeping principle used to justify the broad takfir against individuals and societies, an approach that lacks both sound methodological grounding and adherence to the maqasid (higher objectives) framework of Islamic jurisprudence.
In conclusion, addressing extremist ideologies cannot be limited to description or diagnosis alone. It requires the revival of a sound methodology of ijtihad (jurisprudential independent reasoning) grounded in knowledge, piety, and ethical conduct, alongside the intellectual reformation of the scholarly sphere through a conscious and critical approach to reading texts and interpretations. It also calls for confronting the psychological and social roots of extremism, particularly arrogance and the claim of exclusive access to absolute truth, while reconnecting scriptural interpretation with the higher objectives (maqasid) and compassionate essence of Islamic legal theory.
Islam is fundamentally a religion of mercy, justice, and constructive guidance, not one of extremism, violence, or exclusion. Therefore, intellectual engagement with and refutation of takfir remains the primary means of safeguarding minds and hearts from this dest
