Dr Osama Al-Azhari
Minister of Awqaf (Charitable Endowments)
In earlier articles, we pointed out that extremist intellectual currents have assumed the role of judges over others, misapplying the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil. In doing so, they have misunderstood the Prophetic statement: “Whoever among you sees a wrong, let him change it with his hand.”
As Imam al-Ghazali explains in Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din (The Revival of Islam), anyone who seeks to articulate the rulings of Islamic law and distinguish right from wrong must embody three essential qualities: ‘ilm (illuminating knowledge), wara’ (piety), and husn al-khuluq (upright character). Illuminating knowledge ensures that one does not denounce matters that are subject to legitimate scholarly difference, for issues of recognised disagreement are not to be condemned. Piety safeguards against turning the explanation of religious rulings into a means of domination or control over others. Upright character, meanwhile, ensures that such discourse remains rooted in guidance, education, and moral cultivation presenting rulings in a manner that invites acceptance rather than in arrogance, coercion, or hostility towards people.
Extremist currents have effectively built their entire doctrine of takfir (labelling someone as an apostate) upon a single Qur’anic statement: “And whoever does not judge according to what Allah has sent down, …” a verse that appears in several contexts. It begins with the divine words: “Surely We sent down the Tawrah, wherein there is a guidance and a light,…” and continues: “…. So do not be apprehensive of mankind, and be apprehensive of Me, and do not trade My signs for a little price. And whoever does not judge according to what Allah has sent down, then those are they (who are) the disbelievers.” This is then followed by the descriptions: “…then those are they (who are) the unjust.,” and subsequently: “…then those are they (who are) the immoral.”
What we wish to clarify is that there is a difference between the heart’s believing in the legitimacy of the divine rulings, and between acting upon them in practice – that is, in fiqh, behaviour, living by what is lawful and unlawful, avoiding what is disliked, and drawing near to Allah through recommended acts.
If an individual falls short in applying these rulings whether due to personal weakness, uncertainty, or misjudgment, this does not negate their acknowledgment of the truth of those rulings. In such a case, the person remains, in terms of belief, committed to ruling by what Allah has revealed, even if deficient in practice. This balanced understanding has long been upheld by the scholars of the Ummah (Muslim community), as it leaves room for the sinner, the erring individual, and the one who is negligent. Extremist movements, however, have disregarded this well-established distinction. They treat any shortcoming in the application of ‘ahkam fiqhiyyah (jurisprudential rulings) as equivalent to ruling by other than what Allah has revealed, thereby declaring individuals as apostates on the basis of sins. In doing so, they revive a hallmark trait of the early Kharijites, who were known for labeling Muslims as apostates for their sins during the era of the Companions.
These extremist groups go beyond labeling a Muslim as an apostate for committing a sin; they also extend takfir to entire systems of legislation and judicial institutions. This position is strongly influenced by the clear and explicit assertions of Sayyid Qutb, who regarded such systems as having replaced divine law. From his perspective, the issue is not merely that these systems fail to implement Qur’anic rulings related to prescribed punishments, deterrents, and legal penalties often due to the absence of the necessary conditions for their enforcement. It is well known, for example, that ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab’ suspended the punishment for theft during ‘Aam al-Ramadah (the Year of Famine) because the required conditions for its application were not fulfilled.
Moreover, the verses frequently cited by extremists have been interpreted by Ibn ‘Abbas, ‘Ikrimah, and leading early scholars of exegesis as having been revealed in relevance to the People of the Book who came before us. In this light, ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar described the Kharijites as those who misapply scripture taking verses revealed concerning believers and applying them to disbelievers, and verses revealed concerning disbelievers and applying them to believers; an approach that characterised the earliest Kharijite movement.
We may also consider the statement of Imam Fakhr al-Din al-Razi in his Qur’anic exegesis, where he explains that: “This verse “And whoever does not judge according to what Allah has sent down, then those are they (who are) the disbelievers.” [Qur’an 5:44] comes as a powerful warning following a clear and decisive argument. He notes that this discussion involves two key issues:
First, the primary intent of the verse is to admonish the Jews for deliberately altering the ruling of Allah concerning the punishment of the married adulterer. By denying a rule explicitly established in the Torah and claiming it was not binding, they fell into outright disbelief, thereby forfeiting any valid claim to faith whether in Musa (Moses) and the Torah or in Muhammad and the Qur’an.
Second, the Kharijites argued that any act of disobedience constitutes disbelief. The majority of scholars, however, firmly rejected this claim. The Kharijites relied on this verse, interpreting it as a definitive proof that anyone who judges by other than what Allah has revealed is a disbeliever, and since every sinner does so, all sinners must be disbelievers.
In response to this argument, mutakallimun (theologians) and mufassirun (exegetes) offered detailed refutations. Among them, ‘Ikrimah clarified that the verse applies specifically to those who inwardly deny that all rulings are attributed to Allah and outwardly reject that belief. In contrast, a person who believes that all rulings are attributed to Allah inwardly from their heart and affirms it verbally, yet fails to act accordingly, is still considered to be acting upon Allah’s divine law, even if they neglect its application. Such a person, therefore, does not fall under the condemnation of this verse. This interpretation represents the sound and correct understanding.”
Al-Razi also transmits a statement from Ibn ‘Atiyyah al-Andalusi in his well-known exegesis al-Muharrar al-Wajiz fi Tafsir al-Kitab al-’Aziz [The Concise Edition in Explanation of the Holy Book] in which he discusses the differing scholarly views on the verse: “And whoever does not judge according to what Allah has sent down,” He notes that one group of scholars understood the verse as referring specifically to the Jews, in connection with the descriptions of kafirin (disbelievers), zalimin (wrongdoers), and fasiqin (the disobedient), and this interpretation is supported by certain reports.
This has been the established understanding of Qur’anic exegetes, beginning with the Companions, continuing through the successive generations of scholars, and extending to later authorities such as Shaykh al-Sha’rawi, as previously discussed. Imam Hujjat al-Islam al-Ghazali likewise explains that the verse is understood to refer to one who does not judge by what Allah has revealed while denying or rejecting it. Our discussion is not confined to the views of al-Razi, Ibn ‘Atiyyah in al-Muharrar, or al-Ghazali alone. Rather, the central comparison is between Sayyid Qutb’s interpretation of the verse and the dominant understanding held by the vast majority of Muslim scholars—from the era of the Companions, through the classical imams, and up to Shaykh Muhammad Mitwalli al-Sha’rawi. In contrast to this mainstream scholarly tradition, Sayyid Qutb presents a solitary interpretation that leads to the takfir (labeling as outside the fold of Islam) of parliaments, legal systems, and legislative institutions, and extends takfir broadly to individuals. According to this view, even committing a sin or failing to fully implement certain aspects of Islamic rulings is treated as disbelief.
