Dr Ashraf Abul Saud
One of the most insightful keys to understanding the dynamic behaviour of the US in the Middle East lies in the concept of the “junior partner”.
In international relations and strategic alliances, a junior partner is a state that enters into an alliance or partnership with a significantly more powerful actor.
In such arrangements, the senior partner retains decisive influence over the alliance’s foreign and security policies, shapes strategic decisions, and provides the primary security umbrella and critical resources.
In return, the junior partner is expected to contribute military, logistical, or political support.
The defining characteristics of the junior partner stem from a fundamental imbalance of power.
Possessing far fewer materials, military, or economic resources than its dominant counterpart, this junior partner lacks the capacity to shape the international system independently.
Consequently, it finds itself in a position of partial dependence, relying on the senior partner for its national security and economic stability.
To safeguard its interests and compensate for its inherent vulnerabilities, the junior partner often adopts co-operative policies aligned with the stronger power.
Within the alliance, the functional roles of the junior partner are typically limited and instrumental: providing intelligence, granting access to military bases, or engaging in direct intervention in regional conflicts on behalf of the senior partner.
These contributions are offered in exchange for protection from regional or international threats, a reliable security umbrella, political recognition, and support that bolster the junior partner’s international, regional, and occasionally domestic standing.
Additional benefits may include privileged access to advanced technology, economic assistance, and entry into international and regional markets.
In managing its junior partners, the great power typically employs three primary strategies.
The first is persuasion, often through subtle coercion, encouraging the adoption of policies that align with its objectives or the reversal of those that do not.
The second is inducement, which involves offering financial aid, military assistance, economic benefits, political backing, and enhanced international standing.
The third, and most coercive, is outright compulsion, pressuring the junior partner to follow specific policies, threatening severe consequences, and highlighting the substantial losses that would result from defiance.
A deeper examination of America’s role in the Middle East reveals that US policy is fundamentally guided by the principle of political realism, or Realpolitik.
This approach consistently places America’s core national interests above any commitments to its allies, particularly its smaller or weaker partners.
When necessary, the US does not hesitate to sacrifice these allies through various means, most notably strategic abandonment and disavowal.
In such cases, the junior partner is left to face the consequences of actions it undertook in alignment with American objectives, as US survival and strategic imperatives take precedence over prior military or political pledges.
Other recurring patterns include the orchestration of “creative chaos” to destabilise partner states, particularly in the Middle East, to reshape their identities or political systems.
This engineered fragility renders the junior partner more vulnerable and easier to abandon or replace.
Washington also frequently imposes unilateral political agendas, making major strategic decisions without meaningful consultation (unilateralism), thereby leaving its smaller allies to bear the consequences alone.
Finally, the US often deploys its allies as an advanced line of defence or a protective shield in military and political confrontations, safeguarding American interests and forces.
Should the ally falter or the threat dissipate, it is frequently left unsupported and isolated.
In accordance with the harsh logic of geopolitics, junior partners are often treated as expendable assets, currency to be traded by the great powers at the negotiating table, rarely receiving meaningful gains in return.
As the ancient proverb goes, when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.
Dr Ashraf Abul Saud is a writer and an international relations scholar.
