The proposal under discussion in Washington and certain Western capitals to establish a Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA), with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair at its helm, has triggered intense debate across the region.
Presented as a mechanism for post-war reconstruction and stabilisation, the plan would create a body endowed with sweeping political and legal powers in Gaza for up to five years, supported by an international peacekeeping force.
On its surface, the concept appears orderly: an interim administration to rebuild institutions, restore services, and prepare the ground for eventual Palestinian self-governance.
Yet, beneath the technical language lies a profound risk: the repetition of one of the most costly mistakes of modern interventionist policy, the Bremer experiment in Iraq.
In 2003, following the invasion of Iraq, the US established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under Paul Bremer. Conceived as a caretaker administration, it quickly became the supreme governing body in Iraq. Within weeks, Bremer issued decrees that dismantled the state’s backbone: de-Baathification expelled tens of thousands of civil servants, and the dissolution of the Iraqi army left half a million trained men unemployed and embittered.
These decisions, taken unilaterally and without Iraqi consultation, ignited chaos. What was intended as a transition to democracy became a collapse into insurgency, sectarian fragmentation, and enduring instability instead. The lesson was clear: external governance, however well-funded or well-intentioned, cannot substitute local legitimacy.
Blair’s proposal
The blueprint for Gaza today bears troubling similarities. According to reports, GITA would exercise supreme political and legal authority in Gaza. It will include a seven-member board, chaired by Blair and supported by a 25-person technocratic secretariat. A multinational force, primarily Arab and UN-endorsed, would enforce order. The mandate could extend up to five years, far longer than the one-year transition outlined in UN discussions. The Palestinian Authority is identified as a future governing authority but would not initially participate in GITA’s decision-making.
Each of these features raises red flags. By side-lining Palestinian institutions, GITA undermines its own stated goal of unification. By concentrating authority in the hands of an external figure, it risks the very outcome it seeks to avoid: alienation and rejection by the people of Gaza.
The Blair factor
The choice of Tony Blair compounds the problem. In Arab public opinion, Blair’s name is inseparable from the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a conflict that devastated the region and eroded trust in Western intentions. His later role as Middle East envoy for the Quartet left little tangible progress and reinforced perceptions of bias towards Israeli and Western positions.
Installing Blair as Gaza’s de facto governor would not symbolise reconstruction. It would symbolise continuity with a legacy of external imposition. Any hope of legitimacy would be compromised before the plan even begins.
Structural risks
Beyond personalities, the structural flaws of the proposed authority are clear. Governance imposed without Palestinian consent will be seen as foreign rule. No administrative efficiency can overcome that perception. A secretariat of international experts may draft plans, but governance in Gaza requires political, social, and cultural grounding. Without it, the authority risks being irrelevant at best and resented at worst. Relying on foreign troops to enforce decisions invites confrontation. Peacekeepers may become targets, deepening tensions rather than easing them. An undefined or prolonged mandate fosters dependency and undermines local institutions. Iraq demonstrated that external authorities rarely hand over power as quickly as promised.
Regional repercussions
For Egypt and other regional stakeholders, the consequences of this experiment would be far-reaching. Endorsing GITA risks appearing complicit in a renewed form of international trusteeship over the Palestinian territory. Such optics are politically costly and undermine regional credibility. The exclusion of the Palestinian Authority offers an opportunity to prolong Palestinian fragmentation while avoiding real political concessions. Backing Blair ties Washington once more to an experiment in imposed governance that is almost certain to fail, reinforcing narratives of Western arrogance.
Egypt, in particular, has direct strategic concerns: the stability of its Sinai border, the humanitarian impact of Gaza’s crisis, and the broader imperative of supporting Palestinian rights within a sustainable political framework.
A prolonged transitional authority led by an external figure would complicate, not ease, these challenges.
Different path forward
If the goal is a genuine transition towards stability and reconstruction, the path must rest on three foundations. The Palestinian Authority and local civil society must be central participants from the beginning. External actors can support capacity-building, but cannot replace indigenous leadership. Any international role should be temporary and tightly defined, with explicit milestones leading to Palestinian self-governance. The United Nations and regional institutions must anchor the process. Only a framework seen as inclusive and balanced will have a chance of acceptance.
The idea of appointing Tony Blair to lead Gaza’s reconstruction is not merely controversial, it is structurally flawed. Like Paul Bremer in Iraq, Blair would represent an external authority wielding sweeping powers without local legitimacy. Iraq’s experience demonstrated the dangers of such an approach: policies made in isolation, enforced by outsiders, and rejected by the very people they were meant to serve.
For Gaza, where the humanitarian toll is immense and political grievances are deeply entrenched, repeating that model would be a grave mistake. What is needed is not another experiment in imported governance, but a process rooted in Palestinian agency, supported by regional partners, and guided by clear, limited objectives.
History’s warning is clear: governance without legitimacy breeds instability. Gaza cannot afford to relearn that lesson.
Mohamed Fahmy is the editor-in-chief of The Egyptian Gazette and
Egyptian Mail newspapers
